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The Arab world amidst the global financial crisis of 2008–2009
Shalendra D. Sharma
Department of Politics, University of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA
Abstract
When the problems in the United States housing sector mushroomed into a global financial crisis by September
2008, it was assumed that Arab countries would remain immune: the oil‐rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries because of their massive financial reserves, and the resource‐poor countries because of their limited
linkages to the global economic system – in particular, the global financial markets. However, this assumption
has proven to be false. The US subprime mortgage collapse not only pushed the advanced economies into
recession, but also it shattered global economic confidence, resulting in a massive financial contagion around
the world. What explains the Arab World's vulnerability to the crisis? How has the crisis impacted both the
resource rich and the resource poor? How have Arab countries responded to the crisis, and what must they do
to insulate their economies better from the vagaries of global financial markets? This paper addresses these
questions.

Keywords
Arab World, financial crisis, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), sovereign wealth funds, the United Arab
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When the subprime‐induced financial crisis broke out in the United States (the country with the
world's most sophisticated financial system) in mid‐2007, it was widely believed that the economic
fallout would be mainly limited to the United States and that American authorities would eventually
contain the crisis. After all, the US economic slowdown was related to factors specific to the US
economy, especially problems associated with expansionary monetary policy that had kept US
interest rates low for some years and led to a real estate (property) bubble, rather than to more
systemic factors such as an oil shock or adverse trade relations (Cohan 2008, Schwartz 2009, Taylor
2009). Even as some analysts predicted a contagion spreading to other economies and regions, there
was broad consensus that the Arab World – an economically diverse region that includes both the
oil‐rich economies in the Gulf and the resource‐poor (in relation to the population), such as Egypt,
Morocco, Syria and Yemen – would either escape or successfully weather the worst of the crisis. 1

The reasons for the Arab countries' supposed immunity to the crisis varied. The prosperous oil‐rich
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states who together control 45% of the world's oil reserves and
18% of the natural gas reserves and are awash with cash from skyrocketing oil prices invested in
their well‐endowed ‘sovereign wealth funds’ (SWFs) seemed well‐sheltered, if not invulnerable, to
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the fast‐spreading subprime‐induced crisis. 2 In fact, SWFs such as the Kuwait Investment Authority
(KIA) and the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) were widely believed to have the capacity
continually to boost liquidity and confidence in both the domestic and the regional economy. 3
Indeed, the GCC countries were seen as possible shock absorbers and ‘stabilizers’ – their
exceptionally strong economic positions serving as both a potential cushion against the global
downturn and the engine pulling cash‐starved economies from recession by providing the
desperately needed liquidity and supporting global demand. On the other hand, for hydrocarbon‐
poor countries, their economic backwardness and relative isolation from the global financial and
capital markets (minus the oil industry, the Arab World accounts for only 2.5% of world economic
growth) was seen as their saving grace – a shield against the vagaries of global financial turmoil.
However, as shown in Table 1, both these predictions have proven to be false. Real gross domestic
product (GDP) growth has declined across the region.

The current crisis has unambiguously and painfully underscored that in today's globalized and
interconnected world no nation is an island. The ferocious contagion or the ‘exogenous shocks’ from
the advanced economies has put the world economy in its most serious crisis since the 1930s
(Krugman 2009, Posner 2009). In the Arab countries, after an initial period of calm and seeming
resilience, the economic turbulence reached both the oil‐rich and oil‐poor economies – albeit the
forces behind the contagion and the impact have been varied and uneven across the region. Despite
the adoption of highly expansionary policies (with the central banks in the region providing
stimulus packages and liquidity, besides lowering reserve requirements and interest rates) in Egypt,
Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Arab countries to mitigate the adverse economic
shocks, the region, nevertheless, saw economic growth contract from 6% in 2008 to 2.5% in 2009. In
fact, the slowdown is broadly similar in oil‐producing and non‐oil‐producing countries – albeit their
socio‐economic impact is varied.
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For example, in the ever‐resilient Kuwait, in keeping with global trends, the country's stock
exchange index fell by 50% in October 2008. However, news that a Kuwaiti bank had suffered
significant losses in late 2008 from trading in currency derivatives further spooked the markets and
saw the third largest bank lose US$1.4 billion – forcing the authorities to guarantee customer
deposits at local banks. In December 2008, Kuwait's largest investment company defaulted on most
of its US$3 billion debt obligations and has been forced to negotiate a debt restructuring. However,
the impact on the real economy has been modest as Kuwait (like other oil‐rich countries) has a
comfortable financial cushion to mitigate the impact. On the other hand, the impact on resource‐
poor countries has been more severe. Since the GCC is a key source of investment financing (through
foreign direct investment [FDI] and other flows) as well as remittances for these economies, the
abrupt decline in income and investment flows has contributed to the overall decline in growth. No
doubt, it has made the lives of about 23% of the 300 million people in the Middle East and North
Africa who draw subsistence on less than US$2 a day much more difficult (The World Bank 2008).

What explains why the current crisis which originated in the US market for subprime mortgages
has spread so quickly and virulently to other credit markets and economies with limited or no
exposure to these toxic assets? What are the ‘transmission channels’ or how specifically has the crisis
spread to the Arab countries? How have the Arab countries been impacted by the crisis and what
are the short‐ and potential long‐term economic implications? How have governments and regional
bodies responded to the challenges posed by the unprecedented crisis in their midst? How can the
Arab countries, especially the poorest, better insulate their economies from the vagaries of the global
financial markets? This paper addresses these issues with reference to selected Arab countries:
Egypt, Yemen and the UAE. 4

Broad transmission channels

The adage that in this era of globalization no country is an island is apt. The volume of international
capital flows has surged from just under US$2 trillion in 2000 to US$6.4 trillion in 2006. These funds
now cross national borders, often at will, despite attempts by governments to control and regulate
their movement. Deep financial integration also means more rapid and powerful spillover across
economies through both traditional trade and more new types of financial channels. 5 As Table 2
shows, Arab countries are quite open in terms of trade – the trade openness index of thirteen Arab
countries averaged around 71.3%. Of course, oil‐exporting countries register the highest indices
reflecting the weight of oil and gas in their exports, as well as the importance of imports in their
economies. 6 Although spillovers through the trade channel remains a central transmission
mechanism (even though global trade patterns have become more diversified), financial spillovers
have become more pronounced as the rising correlation of global equity prices and the potential for
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sudden capital flow reversals mean that shocks at the core can be transmitted rapidly throughout
the entire global financial system (Allen and Douglas 2009).

Significant withdrawals from emerging economies, including the GCC equity and debt funds,
confirm that investors in the advanced economies began to retract from emerging economies around
October 2008. Leading the charge were cash‐strapped US financial institutions that began en‐mass
to ‘deleverage’ or sell their assets to raise cash to strengthen their balance sheets back home. In turn,
this led to sharp drops in stock prices around the world (in the GCC this was most evident in a
widening of sovereign risk spreads and a sharp downturn in stock markets – especially for real
estate companies), the relative increases in the value of the US dollar against all currencies, a reversal
in capital flows, a shortage of liquid foreign reserves, and tighter restrictions on credit availability.
In the GCC this was made worse by expectations of an appreciation of the dirham vis‐à‐vis the dollar.
Further, as investors began to flee global markets for the safe haven of US Treasuries (not only
because of risk aversion, but also due their need to sell assets to raise cash to cover debts), stock
markets around the world plunged and many currencies depreciated – some overnight.

Exacerbating the problem was the proliferation of new hybrid products such as derivatives,
sovereign credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and new forms of mortgage‐backed
securities. Coupled with creative accounting practices that often overlooked risk and prudent
corporate governance it has meant that economies that earlier had been relatively sheltered could
be suddenly hit – especially if there were concerns regarding equity and currency mismatches. This
partly explains the rapidity by which equity and bond prices plummeted, sovereign and corporate

4

This is the post-printed version of an article. The final published version is available at Contemporary Arab Affairs 3:1 (2010); doi: 10.1080/17550910903541835
ISSN 1755-0912 (Print) / 1755-0920 (Online)
Copyright © 2010 The Centre for Arab Unity Studies. Published online: 21 Jan 2010

spreads increased, and inter‐bank spreads rose. Beyond these conduits, global shifts in market
sentiment or ‘risk aversion’ which often manifest themselves through low public confidence and
herd behaviour in markets have been particularly pronounced in this crisis. The sharp deterioration
in household wealth in the advanced economies and concern about the overall soundness of the US
economy and the exposure of hitherto unknown domestic structural vulnerabilities have resulted in
a heightened sense of vulnerability and a rise in risk aversion. This has only led to further reduction
in household consumption and precautionary saving.

Specific transmission channels: the cases of Egypt and Yemen

Between 2007 and mid‐2008, the Egyptian economy had been growing at an unprecedented rate of
about 7%. The unemployment rate was down from 11% to 8%, and the seemingly entrenched
poverty levels were finally on the decline. The country's financial sector, especially banks and
investment companies, were not large holders of subprime mortgage‐backed securities – the so‐
called ‘toxic assets’ – and banking sector reforms, especially in the area of bank supervision and
consolidation of non‐performing loans (NPLs), had made the banking sector more resilient. Just as
important, Egypt's net international reserves stood at a robust US$35 billion in October 2008
(International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2009a). Yet, these robust fundamentals have hardly made the
Egyptian economy immune to the contagion emanating from the advanced economies. In large part
this is because the resource poor or the non‐oil exporting Arab countries such as Egypt already
facing significant economic pressures and heavily depended on external assistance (in the form of
aid, FDI, and through worker remittances) were from the outset extremely susceptible to exogenous
economic shocks. In fact, countries such as Egypt and Yemen, but also Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and
Lebanon, depend much on exports, tourism, remittance receipts from workers abroad (largely from
Europe and the GCC countries), and more recently through FDI flows. In most of these countries
the revenue generated accounts for a substantial proportion of their GDP. A decline of these
revenues both in absolute terms and as a share of GDP has had negative consequences for growth
and development.

The Egyptian economy has been impacted via a number of broad transmission channels discussed
above such as global deleveraging and a drop in export revenues, as well as country‐specific ones
such as contraction in the tourism industry and sharp reductions in Suez Canal tolls and remittances
from expatriate workers. The sharp decline in export volumes to the Euro Area, East Asia and the
United States has hit Egypt hard. Similarly, tourism, which is the country's major foreign exchange
earner (bringing in some US$11 billion dollars in 2007), and contributing 8.5% of Egypt's GDP, has
experienced a significant decline since mid‐2008. According to the Egyptian Ministry of Economic
Development, ‘each tourist dollar spent ultimately generates US$4 or US$5 in income’ – showing a
strong correlation between incomes and tourism (Mohieldin 2008). Similarly, in the fiscal year 2007–
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2008 (end of June 2008), remittances from Egyptian expatriate workers (the vast majority work in
the oil‐rich Gulf countries) sent about US$8.56 billion to the home country. 7 However, the economic
crisis has forced a major retrenchment with massive layoffs of emigrant workers. In fact, thousands
of workers from Egypt, Yemen, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip (among other countries) have
already returned ‘home’ from the Gulf – adding to the ranks of the unemployed. Exacerbating
Egypt's woes has been the loss of revenue from the Suez Canal. Despite concerns about pirates off
the Somali coast, the waterway earned a record US$5.2 billion in 2007. However, the shrinkage in
global trade and the resultant drop in the numbers of ships using the canal have led to a sharp drop
in toll revenue – which stood at US$301.8 million in February 2009 – a 25% decline compared with
the US$408 million in January 2008. Moreover, plunging exports of manufactured goods to the
United States and the European Union, and food exports to the European Union and the Arab World
have exacerbated the problem of falling revenues and growing unemployment. Overall, the
country's real GDP growth fell by 2 percentage points in 2008/2009 and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) projects a further decline to about 4.5–5.0% in 2009–2010 (IMF 2009a). In mid‐2008, Egypt
experienced an abrupt reversal of portfolio flows as foreign investors pulled out of the equity and
government bond markets. The central bank responded by running down its foreign currency
deposits with commercial banks. The sharp decline in external liquidity has raised the cost of debt
servicing and put pressure on the current account balance (IMF 2009c).

Countries lacking in oil wealth now face weaker prospects for exports, FDI, tourism, and remittances
as the worldwide recession has deepened. The case of Yemen is illustrative. Yemen is one of the
poorest countries in the Arab World. Its economy has been stagnating with an estimated 35% of its
population living below the poverty line. As the Middle East and North Africa is the world's largest
net food‐importing region, Yemen, like a large number of countries in the region, suffered heavily
from the food and fuel crisis which preceded the onset of the global financial crisis. With food (and
oil) prices skyrocketing to record levels over 2006 to mid‐2008, the terms of trade for food and oil‐
importing countries, including Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, among others,
plummeted – with rising inflation (around 17% in Yemen) having an adverse effect on the poor (IMF
2008b). Yet, when the financial crisis broke and food and oil prices sharply declined, it provided
some relief to countries reeling under its inflationary impact. Furthermore, Yemen's isolation from
the global economy was seen as a blessing. Like most resource‐poor Arab countries, Yemen is
insulated from global financial markets. Yemeni banks have low exposure to private foreign lending
and portfolio investment is almost non‐existent given the absence of a domestic stock market or
commercial credit market (IMF 2009e). Yet, Yemen is highly vulnerable to commodity shocks as it is
an importer of food and inputs, and depends heavily on remittances from workers in the Gulf, and
FDI in the form of official aid. In fact, the case of Yemen confirms the empirical evidence that aid is
procyclical with donor incomes. Moreover, domestic financial institutions have limited deposits and
liquidity. Therefore, unlike its resource‐rich neighbours, Yemen does not have the wherewithal to
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meet revenue shortfalls. This means that Yemen has been unable to put in place a vigorous fiscal
stimulus to respond to the economic downturn. As a result, the crisis has hit Yemen particularly
hard. Already the loss of revenue from returning workers has placed great pressures on government
expenditures, as have declines in donor assistance and tighter external financing conditions. This
has translated into ballooning fiscal deficits, pressures on the balance of payments and overall
worsening of the country's budgetary position. If unemployment and poverty levels continue to
increase, it could have adverse implications for social and political stability.

Specific transmission channels: the UAE

The experience of the UAE, at least of some of the federation's member states, underscores the fact
that wealth is not necessarily a protection against financial crises. Rather, misallocation of resources
can make even wealthy states extremely vulnerable to a fast‐moving financial crisis. However, when
the crisis began, the UAE was assumed to be well insulated from the global financial turbulence
despite the fact that its economy is among the most globally integrated in the world. 8 In fact, the
UAE is an important participant in global capital markets through several ‘blue‐chip’ investment
institutions, including the Abu Dhabi Investment Council, the Dubai Ports and Free Zone World,
Dubai Holding and the Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC). In addition,
the Dubai Financial Market, Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, Nasdaq Dubai and the Saudi Stock
Exchange are an integral part of global financial markets. Moreover, the UAE's banking sector awash
with ‘windfall’ liquidity from record oil prices was seen as being healthy. In fact, the UAE's banking
system were not only well capitalized, but also highly profitable as the ‘banks' assets and profits
increased sharply in 2007 and the capital adequacy ratio stood at 13.3 percent by mid‐2008, above
the regulatory minimum of 10 percent’ (IMF 2009b). 9 In fact, one of the unintended outcomes of the
punitive investment restrictions imposed by the United States (especially on Middle East nations)
after September 2001 forced the GCC to diversify its massive foreign exchange surpluses regionally.
That is, instead of investing the bulk of its revenues in US Treasury bills or in eurodollar accounts
at multinational banks, the GCC government's began aggressively to build up their SWFs, including
investments in a variety of domestic state‐controlled institutions (Table 3). The UAE, which began
devoting a significant portion of its oil revenues in the SWFs was able to build up a colossal ‘war
chest’ worth more than US$875 billion by May 2007. This massive accumulated wealth (at least
relative to its GDP) was seen as a bulwark that could be used to mitigate the effect of oil price
cyclicality and support continued investments to sustain growth. Finally, since the federation's
write‐downs from subprime assets were minimal, it was seen as being immune to the crisis.

Yet, in the oil‐producing countries where the export of hydrocarbons is the single most important
determinant of economic success, the rather abrupt drop in oil prices (from US$147 per barrel in July
2008 to US$38.60 per barrel in December 2008) was an ominous sign. Indeed, according to The World
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Bank (2009a), ‘for the GCC in aggregate, oil and gas revenues dropped from US$670 billion in 2008
to an estimated US$280 billion during 2009 – a massive decline equivalent to 38 percent of the
group's GDP’ (p. 126). In the UAE, the sharp decline in the price of oil heightened concerns, namely
that since the oil sector accounts for about 37% of the Emirate's GDP, it could now face deflation as
the era of cheap credit was over and that the federation would not be able to generate the
considerable fiscal surpluses to meet its ambitious, if not, profligate spending targets. 10 In addition,
several SWFs in the Gulf region have suffered heavy losses on equity investments following the
sharp slide in stock markets in 2008. It is believed that the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA)
has lost an estimated US$125 billion in 2008 after the credit crisis sharply cut asset prices. According
to Setser and Ziemba (2009), the SWFs and foreign‐currency funds of the GCC have lost about 27%
of their assets – or US$350 billion in 2008 alone.

Compounding this, and to some the real threat, was the Emirates (especially Dubai's) real estate
sector's potential exposure to global markets – in April 2008, ‘the six members of the GCC …
announced or begun projects worth US$1.9 trillion’ (The Economist 2008). Specifically, when the
Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) free‐zone opened in 2004, it soon became the world's
fastest‐growing financial centre boasting the presence of hundreds of banks and insurance
companies from around the world. 11 Since foreign financial institutions did not have to pay any
tax on profits and faced no restrictions on foreign exchange or repatriation of capital, they expanded
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rapidly via franchising their operations throughout the region and lending to the Emirates booming
real estate and construction sectors. However, foreign banks were not the only willing lenders. The
UAE's banks and financial institutions in partnership with foreign subsidiaries also engaged in
rampant speculative lending in real estate. Indeed, over the past decade, the UAE via its quasi‐
government companies (including Nakheel, Emaar and Dubai Properties) invested billions in its
property sector in an effort to diversify its economy and reduce dependence on the oil industry.

As a result, the UAE experienced a boom in property development – boasting more glittering
skyscrapers than Manhattan – and with prices to match. The lid came off the real estate sector
following Dubai's decision to allow foreign investors to buy property in designated areas on a
freehold basis in 2002. The red‐hot property market literally ‘exploded’ with skyrocketing property
values, rampant speculation, and 24‐hour construction to meet insatiable demand – not only in
Dubai, but also in every area of the Emirates. The most ambitious, the mega‐projects, included the
three Palm Islands and Burj Dubai – at 818 meters the world's tallest building. Yet, what was not
fully known was the extent of the banks' (both foreign and domestic) exposure to the real estate
market via loans to developers, namely if these loans were backed by strong collateral. Given this,
there was palpable fear that a sharp reversal in the UAE's real estate and property market could (like
the United States) implode with devastating effect.

In October 2008, Nakheel, one of the Emirate's big three land developers (as well as companies
directly controlled by Dubai's bullish ruler, Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid al‐Maktoum such as
Dubai World, Investment Corporation of Dubai, and Dubai Holding), announced that it was scaling
back dredging work on its massive Palm Deira Project – the largest of three Palm Island archipelagos
audaciously named ‘the World’ as the island is designed as a replica of the world. Together, ‘the
World’, an archipelago of some 300 artificial islands created just off the coast of Dubai, boasted that
upon completion it would house more than 1 million ‘highly selective’ residents who would have
access to state‐of‐the‐art conveniences – not only luxury complexes personally designed by no other
than the irrepressible Donald Trump himself, but also the world's largest indoor ski slopes featuring
fresh powder year round.

The ‘unthinkable’ shocking news about Nakheel served as a wake‐up call and finally to underscore
that Dubai's real estate bubble built on the back of borrowed cash and speculative investment was
finally unravelling. As global deleveraging intensified, it led to a large contraction in liquidity and
severe tightening of credit conditions, particularly in countries that were highly leveraged and
dependent on foreign lines of credit such as Dubai. Soon this resulted in distressed sales of Dubai
property, including the high‐end Palm Jumeirah – which saw prices plummet as investors rushed
to offload homes and other property. Among the casualties was the exquisite tower Donald Trump
promised would be ‘the ultimate in luxury’ and a US$100 billion beachfront resort complex. By early
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November 2008, property prices fell by 4% in Dubai and 5% in Abu Dhabi for the first ever since
2002. 12 But this was just the beginning. By the end of November prices had dropped by 25%.
Sensing further losses, the large foreign banks that had been financing the UAE's and much of
Dubai's real estate boom quickly began to pull out. The burden now fell squarely upon local banks
and financial institutions, most of which were simply ill‐equipped to deal with the burden. Abu
Dhabi's largest mortgage lender Amlak Finance shocked investors when it announced (in early
November) that it was temporarily halting new home loans. A few days later the UAE's biggest
bank, Emirates NBD, announced its decision to stop lending to foreigners who work for Dubai's
property firms. Other banks followed suit. Worried about the health of their loan‐to‐value ratios,
banks either refused to lend or simply lent less. By the end of 2008 the UAE's once‐booming property
sector lay moribund – not only facing a major slowdown in loan growth and real estate activity, but
also potential collapse. Only the UAE could now provide the desperately needed liquidity. 13

Yet, with an estimated US$1.8–2.0 trillion in foreign assets (by the end of 2008), of which roughly
60% was in dollars, it was only a matter of time before the GCC would experience asset depreciation
(Woertz 2008, pp. 1–21). These were soon felt on the Emirates stock markets as stock and asset values
plunged and the SWFs took their share of losses, especially funds with a high allocation in equities.
It has been estimated:

that GCC sovereign wealth funds lost 27 percent of their value in the 12 months ending December
2008, with losses as high as 40 percent among those funds heavily allocated to emerging markets
and private equity placements. GCC equity prices in dollar terms dropped by some 58 percent
between September 15, 2008 and March 12, 2009 (a period during which virtually all bourses
registered sharp declines). Over the same period, equity prices in UAE plummeted by 70 percent,
contrasted with a decline of 55 percent for all emerging markets.

(The World Bank 2009a, pp. 126–

127)

On 16 November the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) index closed at 1981.44 points, falling by 68.51%
from the year's peak of 6291.87 points on 15 January with a loss of 4.67 billion dirhams (US$1.27
billion) in market value. On the same day, the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) also fell to its
lowest point in 2008, with its general index hitting 2755.62, down 46.48% from 5148.49 points on 11
June with a loss of 1.52 billion dirhams.

The UAE Central Bank responded vigorously (and pre‐emptively) to mitigate the adverse economic
developments, in particular the drying‐up of liquidity following the outflow of foreign deposits. On
22 September 2008, the bank announced the establishment of an emergency lending facility of 50
billion dirhams to provide much‐needed liquidity for the banking sector, and on 8 October it
announced a 2‐percentage‐point cut in its lending rate to 3% – again to generate liquidity of local
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banks. On 8 October the bank lowered the rate on its repurchase of certificate of deposit (REPO)
from 2.0% to 1.5%. The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) and the ADIA also repatriated part of
their foreign assets and deposited them in domestic banks to provide liquidity. In addition, SWFs'
resources have been used to invest in local equity markets, and the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA)
and the KIA have purchased domestic bank shares to help enhance bank capitalization. Equally
significant, to prevent spillovers from global turmoil and boost confidence in the economy, the
central banks in a number of countries (the UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) announced they would
provide a three‐year blanket guarantee to deposits and savings in all national banks and foreign
banks with ‘significant operations’ in the federation, including a guarantee to all interbank lending
operations between banks. It also made a commitment to inject liquidity in the financial system if
and when necessary. The government's decision to inject an additional 70 billion dirhams into the
banking system in late October 2008 under an ‘emergency liquidity support fund’ (in the form of
interest‐yielding government deposits) to provide banks with long‐term funding relief underscored
the UAE's willingness to restore liquidity to the markets and rebuild confidence in the Emirates
financial sector (IMF 2009f).

However, the policy response, including the purchase in February 2009 by the UAE's Central Bank
of US$10 billion of Dubai's bonds, provided some respite, but failed to stop the panic or the financial
bleeding. This is because although the global financial turmoil in the Emirates' (and the GCC
countries') banking sector has been uneven, all have seen a reduction in their profitability due to
reduced growth in business volumes, tighter interest rate margins, increased credit costs, and direct
and indirect exposure to the increasingly volatile local stock and property markets. For states like
Dubai, which unlike oil‐rich Abu Dhabi relies on debt and equity finance raised on international
markets to support its overly ambitious plans, access to credit has become a huge problem. The fact
that the UAE Central Bank quietly purchased half of a US$20 billion five‐year bond issued by Dubai
was seen as proof that Dubai was having trouble meeting its US$80 billion debt obligation. Not
surprisingly, property prices which had fallen by about 25% in the last quarter of 2008 fell by the
same amount in the first quarter of 2009. According to The Economist, in March 2009 the ‘UAE
developers had postponed US$335 billion‐worth of construction projects. One two‐year project was
proceeding so slowly that it would take 20 years to complete’. Similarly:

the debt of Dubai's government and government‐controlled companies is about $80 billion.
Almost $11 billion comes due this year (including interest) and $12.4 billion next. Nakheel
alone must refinance a $3.52 billion bond in December and another worth 3.6 billion
dirhams ($980 million) five months later.

(The Economist 2009)

According to the IMF, the decline in oil prices coupled with OPEC production cuts are projected to
reduce oil export revenues by almost 50% in 2009 – or a loss of some US$300 billion compared with
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2008. ‘As a result, oil exporters' current account surplus of around US$400 billion in 2008 is expected
to turn into a deficit of US$30 billion in 2009’ (IMF 2009d). This will further compound the problems
faced by some 1.5 million foreigners working in GCC countries. South Asians, in particular Indian
nationals who make the largest expatriate community, mostly work as contract labourers – often on
perilous construction sites earning as little as US$150 a month. The literal grounding to a halt of the
once booming construction industry has hit these traumatized workers particularly hard because,
among other restrictions, employees who lose work in the UAE and other states automatically have
their visa rescinded, generally giving them about 30 days to leave the Emirate. This is unfortunate
as the large expatriate community, even unemployed, can help support domestic demand to
stimulate growth in the non‐oil GDP.

Responding to the challenges

Of course, given a crisis of this magnitude, a sustained economic recovery is only possible with the
restoration of the global financial markets, in particular the unclogging of credit markets and growth
in demand in the United States, the European Union and other advanced economies. The Arab
World's challenge in the near term is to preserve the region's financial stability and cushion the
impact of the global slowdown. This will not be easy if the global recession is prolonged, and for the
region's stabilizers, the oil‐rich countries, the price of oil remains below US$50. This could result in
further deterioration in the balance sheet of financial institutions, besides adversely impacting
investor and consumer confidence. For the Arab countries, especially in the UAE, if the global
economy does not pick‐up, there is the possibility of further asset price corrections. As noted above,
the sharp downturn in asset prices since early 2008 has already translated into losses for the SWFs.
If this trend continues, it would place even greater stress on the financial institutions of the Emirates.
Given this, there is no better time than now to review the SWFs long‐term strategy for individual
countries and the region. In particular, SWFs not only can play a greater role in supporting domestic
macroeconomic and financial stability, but also can pursue profitable investment opportunities in
the region.

Furthermore, the Arab countries can both individually and collectively put in place policies to
mitigate the adverse impact of the crisis as well as lay the foundations of future growth. There is no
doubt that the Arab countries, especially the economically vulnerable economies, will require
massive fiscal stimulus packages to stave off the immediate negative impacts of the crisis. Yet, these
packages must be geared toward job creation and investment in infrastructure, including properly
targeted safety net programmes to alleviate the suffering of those most adversely affected by the
crisis. 14 Moreover, the stimulus packages must be well coordinated across countries so the
outcomes can be reinforcing across the region. Both the oil‐rich Arab countries (which despite their
own difficulties have greater fiscal space and are in a stronger position to help) as well as multilateral
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financial institutions such as The World Bank and the IMF must help fund the stimulus packages
for the region's poorer nations. In fact, for low‐income Arab countries, an increase in donor financing
will be necessary to maintain aggregate demand and enhance social safety nets.

Finally, one of the lessons of the Great Depression was that lack of cooperation and retreat into
protectionism exacerbated the depression. Clearly, UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al‐
Nahayan understands this and has embraced multilateralism and a cooperative approach to solve
economic and financial challenges. The UAE along with the six Gulf Arab countries that make‐up
the GCC have been working together to stem the economic challenges. Yet, besides adopting
expansionist policies discussed above, the other item on top of their agenda seems to be putting in
place a long‐planned pact to issue a single currency before a self‐imposed 2010 deadline for
monetary union. Of course, this raises the thorny question regarding the dollar peg. Specifically,
even as the dollar has been depreciating against major currencies (and central banks around the
world have been gradually moving away from the dollar in an effort to stem losses from the
declining dollar exchange rate), the UAE and the GCC have for long stated that they would not de‐
peg their currency from the dollar as the dollar peg had served them well for decades. 15 The five
GCC members (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain) peg their currencies to the dollar
– thereby setting an official reference rate at which central banks buy and sell. The only exception is
Kuwait, which in 2007 abandoned its peg and now links its currency to a currency basket that
includes the dollar, the euro, the yen, and the pound sterling. The five GCC members have long
maintained that the peg strengthens economic cooperation in the region, reduces the speculative
pressure on regional currencies, prevents capital flight in UAE banks toward foreign‐denominated
accounts, and that continuing the peg is an important requirement for issuing a common currency
by 2010. 16 However, as the dollar has further plummeted, member states, most notably Dubai
(including business interests in the region), have urged member states to rethink the peg and the
region's broader monetary policy – namely, for the GCC to peg against a basket of currencies. They
claim that such a policy would not only take into account the region's growing trade with the euro
zone and Asia, but also curb the region's growing inflation problem. 17 Dubai and other states of
the UAE (the UAE is one of the world's main holders of dollar‐denominated assets) are also
concerned that the dollar's decline is hurting expatriates (both professionals and ordinary workers)
from taking jobs in Dubai and other UAE states.

In early 2008, the UAE Central Bank set up a task force to study a possible de‐pegging or revaluation
of the dirham from the dollar. The study concluded that the dollar was a reliable peg for the Gulf
currencies and that the GCC's planned common currency would remain linked to the dollar.
Evidently, this strong endorsement helped reserve the large private capital inflows that were driven
by expectations of an appreciation of the dirham vis‐à‐vis the dollar. Indeed, currency futures
indicate that markets no longer doubt the peg. Moreover, in recent weeks (April–May 2009), the fact
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that countries with pegged exchange rates (Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria and the UAE) have benefited from the continued monetary easing in the United States seems
to have vindicated the central bank's decision. Nevertheless, what is certain is that in the near future
the GCC will need a new monetary regime with a single currency set against a basket of currencies
and interest rates that are appropriate to the domestic economy. In that sense, revaluation should
be seen as the first step towards a GCC single currency. No doubt, even as the debate on the merits
and demerits of the peg will continue (currently the only alternative given serious consideration is
re‐pegging the dirham to a stronger basket of currencies), deeper intraregional trade among the
Arab countries should be accelerated as it can act as a buffer against global downturns. Currently,
the region is more integrated through labour mobility than through trade and investment. Although,
regional integration from FDI and portfolio investments have risen in many Arab countries, the
extent of intraregional trade still remains lower than in all other regions of the world, except for
South Asia. Intraregional integration via freer movement of goods, services, labour and capital,
including harmonization of regulatory and supervision standards, can help improve the
competitiveness and resilience of the region.

Postscript
On 25 November 2009, the Dubai government was forced to ask its creditors for a six‐month
payment standstill on an estimated $60 billion of liabilities owed by one of its own flagship
conglomerates, Dubai World. 18 Coming at a time when many felt the worst of the crisis was over,
this sent shock waves throughout the global financial and stock markets. The situation was further
compounded when a senior government official (the Director General of Dubai's Department of
Finance) stated that the Emirate did not believe it was under any obligation to stand behind the
debts of Dubai World forever, and that creditors should take their share of the responsibility.
Investors who had long been under the assumption of a blanket guarantee provided by the
federation were clearly shocked and unnerved. Panicked investors fearing a possible bank‐run, and
at worst, a sovereign default (as the Dubai government felt no responsibility to guarantee the debts
of a state‐owned company), began to flee by retreating to the traditional safe haven: the US dollar.
The panic only subsided after the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates promised to ‘stand
behind’ the region's banks by providing more emergency liquidity. Although fears have receded for
now, the inability and unwillingness of the Dubai government to refinance the debt of its own
company (Dubai World), has been a rude awakening for investors around the world. Investors can
no longer take for granted the explicit backing governments have traditionally given to state‐owned
companies against insolvency. The reality is that governments around the world have responded to
the financial crisis by taking on unsustainable levels of debt and many are simply no longer in a
position to provide more finance – Dubai is a case in point. Finally, the manner in which the
government of Dubai handled (or mishandled) this issue has done damage to its credibility and put
a significant stain on its once stellar reputation as the premier place to do business in the Arab world.
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Notes
1. The Arab World, broadly termed the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) by The World Bank
includes: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, and Yemen.
2. GCC countries include the UAE, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.
3. While there is no agreed upon definition of an SWF, the US Department of Treasury defines SWFs
as government investment vehicles funded by foreign exchange assets that are managed separately
from official reserves. More broadly, SWFs are investment funds controlled by governments. They
are state‐owned investment funds composed of financial assets such as stocks, bonds, real estate, or
other financial instruments funded by foreign exchange assets. SWFs can be structured as a fund or
as a reserve investment corporation. The types of acceptable investments included in each SWF vary
from country to country. For example, countries with liquidity concerns limit investments to only
very liquid public debt instruments. A number of countries have created SWFs to diversify their
revenue streams. For example, funding for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund comes from
oil revenues; the government of Singapore Investment Corporation is funded through foreign
exchange reserves; while the UAE relies on its oil exports for its wealth. As a result, the UAE devotes
a portion of its reserves in an SWF that invests in assets that can act as a shield against oil‐related
risk. The amount of money in SWFs is substantial. The estimated value of all SWFs is estimated to
be US$3.6 trillion – and if current trends hold, they are projected to reach US$10 trillion by 2012
(International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2008a).
4. The UAE is a federation of seven states situated in the south‐east of the Arabian Peninsula. They
include: Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al‐Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al‐Quwain.
5. Of course, the trade and financial channels of crisis transmission often interact because the
availability of trade credit is linked to trade volume.
6. The ‘trade openness index’ is the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP.
7. Remittances totalled US$6.3 billion in 2007 – up 25% over 2006 levels (The World Bank 2009b, p.
15).
8. Over the past decade, the UAE has pursued ambitious free‐market policies to diversify its
economy away from a dependence on fossil fuel. In 2004, the United States and the UAE entered
into a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) which established a formal dialogue to
promote increased trade and investment between the two countries.
9. By the end of 2008, only a few Gulf banks had exposure to subprime loans. Abu Dhabi Commercial
Bank with US$272 million, Bahrain's Arab Banking Corporation with US$1.2 billion, and Kuwait‐
based Gulf Investment Corporation with US$446 million, and Bahrain's Gulf International Bank was
downgraded by Moody's because of the bank's holdings of US mortgage‐backed securities. It had
to make provisions for US$966 million and raise additional capital (Woertz 2008, p. 8).
10. Abu Dhabi accounts for 94% of the UAE's crude oil output. Not surprisingly, is the wealthiest of
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the seven members of the Emirates with more than half of its GDP.
11. In fact, Dubai came to rival Bahrain, the major financial centre in the region for more than four
decades.
12. According to the Cummins (2008), the average asking price for homes in Dubai fell by 4% in
October 2008 from September 2008, while prices for the upscale Dubai ‘villas’ fell by 19%. In the
next‐door emirate Abu Dhabi, average home prices fell by 5%.
13. On 11 May 2009, Nakheel confirmed it was receiving funds from the Dubai government to meet
its outstanding obligations. In 2009, Dubai sold US$10 billion of bonds to the UAE Central Bank to
raise funds to support cash‐strapped state‐linked companies and plans to issue another US$10
billion in bonds later this year.
14. In fact, job creation is very critical as unemployment in the region is high with 14% of the labour
force on average being unemployed, compared with a world average of 6.7%. Unemployment is
particularly acute among youths and women.
15. The dirham was adopted as the official currency of the UAE in 1973 when it was pegged to the
US dollar at a rate of 3.9474. In 1978, the dirham was de‐pegged. The dirham's exchange rate against
the US dollar was raised to 3.671, and in 1998 the exchange rate was adjusted to 3.672.
16. Only Oman has ruled out revaluing its currency, arguing that a weaker rial helps attract foreign
investment and make exports more competitive – and in the process it offsets inflation. It has also
ruled out joining the plan to create a single currency. Oman also dropped out of proposed monetary
union in 2006.
17. An undervalued dirham imports inflation into the UAE because exports are priced in US dollars
and the bulk of imports in other currencies.
18. It is estimated that the total debt Dubai owes is about $80 billion – with Dubai World shouldering
the bulk. Dubai World, an investment company, is owned by the government of Dubai. It is one of
the three main state‐owned enterprises in Dubai, besides the Investment Corporation of Dubai and
Dubai Holdings (which ‘owns’ the Jumeirah Hotel Group, including the seven star Burj Al Arab).
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